Welfare and Development (Pakistan), Combating Child Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation and Involvement of Children in Intolerable Forms of Child Labor: Pakistan country report (1998). However, see also United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Sexually Abused and Sexually Exploited Children and Youth in Pakistan: A qualitative account of their health needs and available services in selected provinces
, www.unescap.org/esid/hds/sae/pakistan.pdf .
"To make conversation at a dinner party at the World Economic Forum in Davos, I once asked the then-finance minister of Pakistan whether child labour was a problem in his country. Perhaps thinking I was a potential investor, he replied, 'No, child labour is not a problem. You can hire all the children you want.'" Alan B. Krueger, The Political Economy of Child Labor, in International Labor Standards, cited supra n.5, 248-55, at 248.
The US legislation is codified at 19 U.S.C. §2461 et seq., the requirement that 3 trade preferences in the Generalized System of Preferences program on particular labor standards in the exporting country, is similarly known entirely through anecdote. The lack of systematic 78 empirical research into the impact of transnational labour standards casts its shadow over the entire field. Economic analyses, definitely including this Chapter, revert to modeling standards in ideal labour markets, when the one thing we know about labour regulation is that it often has different real-world consequences than would be predicted by economic theory that assumes classical labour markets. 9 Despite this major empirical uncertainty, legal scholars who examine transnational labour standards typically focus on three major features of the current legal regime that seem anomalous or puzzling from a legal point of view. First, the multiplicity of norms; in particular, the contrast between multilateral and bilateral norms . Second, particularly in the United States, the choice among international, transnational, or distinctly American standards (whether created specially for foreign workplaces, or the same standards applied at home). Third, the ineffectiveness, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/regs/naalc/naalc.htm , 296 F.3d 810 (9 Cir. 2002) , where the court applied the Civil Rights Act to a California th corporation without facilities and too small to be covered by the Act, by combining it with a maquiladora electronics factory that it owned in Tijuana, Mexico. This permitted a claim by an executive of Korean origin, now an American citizen, working at the Tijuana plant. The court explained that the statutory reference to U.S. citizens did not mean that the legislation was restricted only to such U.S. citizens. It is not easy to explain how a Mexican citizen, working in Mexico for a plant owned by a U.S. employer, can be a statutory employee under the U.S. Civil Rights Act for purposes of counting employees, but not for purposes of complaining about discrimination.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 sets out "trade negotiating 13 objectives" for the United States, as part of setting up a system limiting Congress's ability to revise trade agreements, once negotiated. Among these objectives are "to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with the core labor standards of the ILO (as defined in section 2113(6), 19 USC §3813(6) and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights," §2102(a)(6), 19 USC §3802(a)(6); "to seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or 4 approaching absence, of current sanctions. I shall refer to these three questions as the "legal scholar's questions." Let me explain these further.
First, a complete picture of transnational labour standards includes a bewildering array of public and private law. In no particular order, one encounters genuinely international standards, typically promulgated as conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) but possibly also including provisions of international covenants such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. There are also labour rights provisions in formal treaties, such as the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (the so-called "side agreement" to the North American Free Trade 10 Agreement), that are transnational but not international, and thus unsatisfactory to many people for that very reason. Some labour standards are found in domestic legislation. In the U.S., 11 such domestic legislation includes very different models of regulation. The Civil Rights Act applies to the foreign operations of American firms, but in terms only to the American citizens employed there. U.S. trade laws now require all trade agreements to require labour standards in reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade," §2102(a)(7), 19 USC §3802(a)(7); "to promote universal ratification and full compliance with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor," §2102(a)(9), 19 USC §3802(a)(9); "to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction," §2102(b)(11)(A), 19 USC §3802(b) (11) lawmaking authority normally appears as a weakness of transnational labour standards. We lack any model that would explain why this multiplicity might be functional, so it naturally appears as something that could be exploited by corporations seeking the lightest form of regulation.
19
Second, in the U.S., this regulatory redundancy creates painful choices for advocates for workers in developing countries, from the public interest lawyers at the International Labor Rights Fund, to the personal injury lawyers who sued the banana growers hoping to do well by doing good. Bluntly, the efficacy of the law seems inversely related to its international character. The developments summarized at notes 12-17 represent a new aggressive unilateralism by American courts, applying American law to the overseas operations of American firms, with little or no reference to any international standards. Advocates may thus choose law applied by U.S. courts, with U.S. procedure and real monetary remedies (tort law in the banana worker cases; Alien Tort Statute; Civil Rights Act in Kang). It is hard to explain why they should instead explore transnational regimes with vaguer remedies (NAALC); or international standards with no remedies at all (ILO Conventions, UN Covenants). Advocates may hardly be criticized for selecting strategies with remedies. Academics and others who favor genuinely transnational standards are hard-pressed to explain exactly why internationalism is important, in the teeth of this recent American unilateralism. Third, the vagueness or absence of remedies for many regimes of labour regulation naturally make them seem precious and artificial, and limit their interest to many legal scholars and advocates. People who think that standards without sanctions might nevertheless be worth fighting for have not advanced any theory explaining why this might be so.
The thesis of this Chapter is that these three questions-regulatory multiplicity, the value of internationalism, and sanctions--are related, and answered by the same model. I shall argue that transnational labour standards (of all types) arise to solve coordination problems in which countries would gain by cooperation but will be disadvantaged if their trading rivals defect. As such, transnational labour standards fall into a class of strategic problems extensively studied, and formalized, by game theorists. Understanding the strategic aspects of regulating labour standards will help explain why there are multiple sources of legal standards; why international standards are necessary but insufficient; why negotiated bilateral standards are also necessary but insufficient; and how standards without immediate sanctions can build the trust that permit countries to maintain standards that benefit them all. On this view, it also follows that some transnational labour standards enhance efficiency and are fully compatible with comparative advantage, as they will be adopted only when in the interest of the affected country.
These are large claims. I advance them in the spirit of provoking and enriching our mutual inquiries. Ultimately, the test of any legal standard is its impact in the observable world. As we have already observed, our empirical knowledge about the impact of labour standards is particularly weak. However, I hope that the model proposed here will sharpen and guide the search for such understanding.
Part I of this Chapter models transnational labour standards as solutions to coordination games, specifically, the game called "Stag Hunt." Part II reviews the behavioural literature on the actual play of Stag Hunt games in laboratory settings and shows how well it predicts some version of our existing regulatory regime. Part III applies the model to specific regulatory standards, showing how understanding their strategic function explains the level of regulation and the presence or absence of sanctions.
I. The Value of Cooperation: Transnational Labour Regulation as a Stag Hunt
A. Stag Hunts A Stag Hunt is a game in which players can gain by cooperating, but only if everyone else does. If the other player is selfish, the first player is also better off selfish. The game takes its name from a brief observation in Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau describes the beginnings of morality in societies of hunters. The entire passage reads:
Voilà comment les hommes purent insensiblement acquerir quelque idée grossiére des engagements mutuels et de l'avantage de les remplir, mais seulement autant que pouvoit l'exiger l'intérêt présent et sensible; car la prévoyance n'étoit rien pour eux, et loin de s'occuper d'un avenir éloigné, ils ne songeoient pas même au lendemain. S'agissoit il de prendre un Cerf, chacun sentoit bien qu'il devoit pour cela garder fidellement son poste; mais si un liévre venoit à passer à la portée de l'un d'eux, il ne faut pas douter qu'il ne le poursuivit sans scrupule, et qu'ayant atteint sa proye il ne se souciât fort peu de faire manquer la leur à ses Compagnons. 20 spelling and punctuation as in original). The English translations that I consulted all have basic grammatical errors or sound stilted because of reliance on cognates, so with some hesitation I will offer my own translation:
That is how men could imperceptibly acquire some rough idea of mutual obligations, and of the advantages of keeping them, but only insofar as present and perceptible interest might require; for foresight meant nothing to them, and, far from concerning themselves with the remote future, they did not even think about the next day. In hunting a stag, each knew well that for this purpose he had to maintain faithfully his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, no one can doubt that he would pursue it without scruple, and having attained his prey he cared little about having made his companions lose theirs.
The amenability of this passage for analysis as a formal game was apparently first noticed independently by Amartya Sen, Isolation, Assurance, and the Social Rate of Discount, 81(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 112-24 (1967) , and David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study 7 (1969)(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.Pr.). Of course, game theorists do not treat the Stag Hunt as a primitive stage in moral development but rather as a dilemma that might arise in any situation involving gains from cooperation. Interestingly, recent primate research suggests that Rousseau was indeed correct to locate the origins of morality in hunting bands, though the account might apply to species other than human. Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans B.M. De Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 435 Nature 297-99 (18 September 2003)(capuchin monkeys, who cooperate in hunting, will reject the cucumber that they otherwise regard as fair payment for a pebble if they witness another monkey receiving a grape for the same pebble).
As a native of Los Angeles and current resident of New York City, I take on faith all 21 assumptions about hunting.
The mnemonic for this is Roman Catholic.
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The point is that stag makes a much better dinner than hare but can only be hunted in a group in which everyone cooperates, while hare may be hunted individually. If you think that everyone 21 will cooperate, you are better off hunting stag. But if you expect that even one person will go off to hunt hare, then you had better hunt hare yourself.
In formal game theory terms, with two players, Row player and Column player, and payoffs indicated, as is customary (Row, Column): . Stag Hunts are also sometimes called "coordination games" or "weak link" games (since if one player, the "weak link," defects, the others will drop to his level); Amartya Sen calls them "assurance games", Sen, supra n 20. That is, if both players hunt stag they will both get a payoff of 2 for the stag. If either defects to hunt a hare, he will get 1 for the hare and his companion will get nothing. If both know or decide that it is hare that shall be hunted, each will catch a hare for a payoff of 1.
A helpful formal feature of this game is that it may be extended to n-number of players. The selfish strategy (hunting hare) yields a fixed payoff no matter what the other players choose (anyone can catch a hare, apparently), while a cooperative strategy yields increasing payoffs depending on the number of players (the more hunters, the bigger the big game that may be landed).
For simplicity, return to the payoff matrix involving two players. This game has two Nash equilibria: either everyone hunts stag, or everyone hunts hare. Hunting stag is "payoff dominant" (or Pareto optimal) but risky since one can easily be left with nothing. Hunting hare is "risk dominant", "secure", or "maximin," since it has the highest guaranteed payoff. Thus there 23 is one Nash equilibrium (each hunts hare) that is not Pareto optimal. There is no strategy that is dominant in the sense of being the best regardless of what others do. The best strategy depends Camerer, supra n. 23, at 377. directly on what others do, specifically, whether they will cooperate or not. The n-player Stag Hunt is similar, except that it has a n number of Nash equilibria, each short of the Pareto-optimal solution in which everyone cooperates to hunt stag.
The Stag Hunt is easily confused with the more familiar Prisoner's Dilemma, in which players similarly weigh the returns from decisions to cooperate or defect, depending on what a partner does. In fact, in behavioural experiments, subjects often turn Prisoner's Dilemmas into Stag Hunts, cooperating until the partner defects. 24 However, in strict modeling, the games are different. In the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, the highest payoff that a player can receive comes not through cooperation but through being the lucky one who rats on a confederate and is thus rewarded by the prosecutors with a lighter or no sentence. If both prisoners remain silent, they will be convicted of some lesser charge. If both rat, they will be convicted of the main charge. If only one rats he will be set free and his confederate will serve a long sentence. These payoffs might be represented with years of prison, minuses in front to show that the longer term is the worse payoff:
Column player stays silent (cooperates) rats (defects) Row player stays silent -3, -3 -10, 0 rats 0, -10 -6, -6
In such a Prisoner's Dilemma, people can always do better by being selfish, whatever the other does. They prefer mutual cooperation to mutual noncooperation. That is, mutual cooperation achieves the highest social product (here, -3 + -3). But they cannot achieve it, because each player always rationally will select noncooperation. Noncooperation (ratting) always gives the higher payoff, whatever the partner chooses. where the population would die of famine in the time interval between passing up the available hare and the cooperative bringing down of a stag. In such situations, there are no net gains from cooperation and the game is a Prisoner's Dilemma or something else. The assumption of this Chapter, however, is that such situations without gains from cooperation are atypical, and that we may helpfully approach the problem of transnational labour standards as a problem in the institutional arrangements that might help countries achieve gains from cooperation. Ultimately, however, the question of which describes reality is an empirical question.
I hope in future work to specify more precisely the payoffs from cooperating on high 27 labour standards and from deviating for short-term advantage. For present purposes, the payoffs will be crude and ad hoc. However, the crude ad hoc payoffs assumed in this Chapter are in fact compatible with the limited empirical literature on the economic effects of labour standards, specifically including the contributions to this Symposium by Brian Langille and Kevin Banks. That is, Brian Langille is quite correct that there is no general "race to the bottom." That is, flows of trade and investment do not create inexorable pressure on each country to lower its labour standards so as to attain comparative advantage. My assumption here is that this race, if it exists at all, is limited by each country's self interest that places serious constraints on how much 11 assurance game, unlike a Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation is always rational-but only if everyone else does.
B. Transnational Labour Regulation as a Stag Hunt
We model the adoption of transnational labour standards as solutions to Stag Hunts, in which everyone is better off if all cooperate (hunt stag), but there is a risk that any individual actor might pursue short-term advantage by defecting (hunting hare and leaving the others with only the gains from hare hunting). Actors are countries that choose whether or not to adopt and enforce labour standards. They are assumed to be rational in the sense of favoring Paretooptimal actions that improve living standards in their population at least where this can be accomplished without taking away from any.
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Consider the following highly-stylized statement of the problem. It is clearly in the longterm interest of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan that all their children go to school and not work in factories. Going to school builds human capital, attracts more and better foreign investment, and generally results in a richer society for all. However, if (contrary to fact) India and Pakistan 27 it will reduce its labour standards in order to attract foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, Kevin Banks is also correct to observe that there may be advantages to a country in lowering its standards, advantages that I model as short-term.
In fact, there is no evidence of any general "race to the bottom." Every study to examine the question has failed to find an relationship between low labour standards and either foreign direct investment or the competitiveness of exports. 
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actually succeeded in getting all their children out of workshops and into schools, there are certain specific foreign investments that would flow to Bangladesh to take advantage of its child labour, and this would be true even if (as we suppose) Bangladesh knows that it is in its longterm interest that children learn instead of work. This is a classic Stag Hunt. If all countries cooperate in ending child labour, all will be better off. Jobs will be taken by unemployed adults, and children will go to school. But if even one country defects by letting children work, it will capture a certain stream of foreign direct investment that others will not. So, if you think one of your rivals will be selfish, it is rational for you to be selfish, too. There are thus two Nash equilibria: one that is Pareto optimal (no children work), the other that is Pareto suboptimal (children work).
So stated, this is not exactly a new insight, nor one the acquisition of which requires much formal game theory. Child labour, noted John Stuart Mill in 1832, is a case "in which it 28 would be highly for the advantage of every body, if every body were to act in a certain manner, but in which it is not the interest of any individual to adopt the rule for the guidance of his own conduct, unless he has some security that others will do so too." The value of turning toward 29 game theory is the illumination that it offers, particularly in its behavioural version, to the legal scholars' questions of regulatory multiplicity, choosing between unilateral and multilateral norms, and sanctions. trade between two countries can reach at least two equilibria, a low equilibrium in which they may not trade at all (perhaps because of high tariffs), and a higher one marked by low tariffs and more trade. A formal trading agreement may assure the country that is lowering its tariff that its partner will do the same. In this analysis, however, agreements of this type are self-enforcing, requiring no formal enforcement mechanism. If one partner defects (by refusing to lower the tariffs that it had promised to lower, for example), the other simply retaliates by refusing to lower its tariffs.
While we will show that labour standards, like trade agreements, similarly enforce highequilibrium cooperative solutions to games with nonunique equilibria, we will not be able to adopt these economic models of trade agreements. In the world of labour standards, such selfenforcement-through-retaliation is neither feasible nor desirable. To return to our example, if Bangladesh breaks a labour standards agreement by letting children work in factories, it accomplishes nothing if India now lets children start working in its.
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Can countries cooperate to lift labour standards if there are short-term advantages in defecting, and little effective sanction against defectors? Game theory suggests at least three possible areas of research: first, make the theory dynamic by repeating the game; second, examine the behaviour of countries that adopt labour standards to see whether they are compatible with the model; and third, examine behavioural experiments on how people actually play these games. (Again, I recognize there are many areas of research that lie outside game theory, most important being the comparative empirical study of competing public and private attempts to improve labour standards). Phil. 588-98 (1999) ; Skyrms, supra n.23, passim and at 23-29. We will return to this point.
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hare; everyone else is hungry. Rousseau does not explain why the other hunters will tolerate this situation or what, if anything, they might do to enforce the joint project.
A closer approximation to reality is to play the game over and over again, to see whether those with a taste for stag can develop ways of keeping the hare hunters' mind on stag hunting. The theory of repeated games is complex and beautiful, and revolves around a so-called Folk Theorem that states that any Pareto-optimal outcome can be maintained as a Nash-equilibrium if the game is repeated.
The implications for transnational labour standards are obvious.
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However, for present purposes I will not develop my argument with reference to the theory of repeated games.
The second strategy is to examine the behaviour of countries that adopt or ratify transnational labour standards, to see whether this behaviour is consistent with the model that treats such actions as cooperative attempts to realize gains from cooperation and prevent defection to secure short-term advantage. Nancy H. Chau and Ravi Kanbur have examined 33 just this relationship, by studying the time patterns of ratification of four recent ILO conventions dealing with core labour rights. They found that the crucial variable was indeed peer effects. Countries ratify agreements that their peer group has ratified. Peer group, in turn, is defined by countries' export orientation, level of development, and geographic region. There is also some influence on ratification behaviour of the origin of each country's legal system. However, economic and other political variables do not explain propensity to ratify ILO conventions.
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The third strategy to examine behavioural experiments in Stag Hunt games. This has not previously been done in discussions of transnational law. We shall see that observable attempts to create and sustain cooperative behaviour tell us a great deal about the structure of transnational labour standards.
II. Experimental Stag Hunt Games
I have been complaining of the paucity of attempts to accommodate theoretically the range of attempts to regulate labour standards. The same complaint has been made about game theory experiments. Certainly our knowledge of cooperative behaviour in games is not 35 adequate to design a system of transnational labour standards from the ground up. However, the behavioural literature on games is quite illuminating on the three legal scholars' problems: understanding regulatory redundancy (that is, comparing norms that bind two parties with those that bind n parties); understanding unilaterally-imposed norms; and sanctions.
The most basic point is the most transcendentally hopeful. "It is now theoretically well established that when individuals, modeled as freely rational actors with low discount rates, interact in an indefinitely repeated social-dilemma situation, it is possible for them to achieve optimal or near optimal outcomes and avoid the predicted strategies of one-shot and finitely repeated games that yield suboptimal outcomes." We must not lose sight of this insight.
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Countries need not be stuck forever in a low-level equilibrium. If decent working conditions are in their long-term interest, there will be a way of assuring that all will move together to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, even if (as is surely true) it is difficult to know just how to do this.
Second, in experimental stag hunt games, pairs of players nearly always coordinate on the highest payoff.
Third, coordination on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium has never been observed experimentally in large groups. In groups with 14 to 16 participants, after three rounds of play all sessions converged on the lowest possible choice. Even groups as small as 6 routinely 38 converge on the least efficient outcome.
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This might seem to create a role for formal legal standards. Legal scholars who write about game theory love to assert that the communication of a formal legal standard in such a situation will provide a coordination point around which parties will converge. Unfortunately, 40 there is no experimental support for this in the literature on Stag Hunts. When leaders are introduced into experimental games to urge parties to adopt the Pareto-optimal position, they are largely ineffective in changing payoffs. Pairs still find the optimal solution, and large groups (in this experiment, groups of 9 or 10) do not. (However, participants inaccurately attribute effects to the leaders. The pairs inaccurately attribute their success to good leadership, while the large groups inaccurately blame their failure on poor leadership).
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A more promising vehicle for enabling large groups to move to Pareto-optimal cooperative solutions is the model mentioned supra n.34 and explored in Brian Skyrms' new book. Small subgroups of "neighbours" converge on Pareto-optimal solutions, and then, as each bargains with other neighbours, justice is "contagious." I shall explore the implications of this 42 model for transnational labour standards. So far as I know, however, there is no experimental support for the spreading of "justice" in just this way.
III. Working Hypotheses and Tentative Conclusions

A. Working Hypotheses
Applied to the problem of transnational labour standards, the experimental literature suggests the following working hypotheses:
1. The project of transnational labour standards is neither foolish nor hopeless. High standards can be associated with strategies of high labour productivity and do not, in general, deter trade or foreign investment.
2. Nations of the world will not, however, necessarily converge on high labour standards naturally. It is possible to become stuck at a low level equilibrium in which it is not in the interest of any one country to improve its standards unless others do, too.
3. The most important factor in any country's improving its labour standards is the "assurance" (in Amartya Sen's word) that its trading rivals will do the same.
4. It is far more likely that such trust and assurance will be achieved in groups of two than in groups of six or more. Consequently, labour standards provisions in negotiated trade agreements (such as the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, or bilateral trade agreements between two countries) perform an important function and do not detract from true international standards (such as ILO conventions). In other works, multiplicity of regulatory institutions may well be functional and does not necessarily denote a weak or ineffective system. 5. International standards (such as ILO conventions) will probably not be effective in overcoming a low-level equilibrium and moving large groups of countries to a higher-level equilibrium. However, the process of defining such standards may play a role in building trust. For example, they may provide means of showing trading rivals that one is genuinely committed to lifting labour standards, or means of resisting domestic political pressures to lower standards. They may also provide coordination points that will influence bilateral and other negotiations among smaller groups.
6. Game theory models of labour standards cannot definitively answer the question of the need for sanctions. Since a high-equilibrium state in which all countries lift labour standards is itself Pareto-optimal, sanctions are not necessary to prevent defection. (By contrast, in a Prisoner's Dilemma, players can always gain by defecting, and sanctions, or other tools for reordering incentives, are necessary). On the other hand, the chief obstacle to the growth of labour standards is low trust, or lack of assurance that others won't defect to pursue short-term advantage, as may happen if defectors themselves do not trust the group. Sanctions against defection thus may be part of a strategy of moving to a higher equilibrium, so long as they do not destroy the trust and assurance that ultimately must underlie transnational labour standards.
This is an extraordinarily difficult problem in modeling to which I will have to return in subsequent work. However, some aspects are clear. Transnational labour standards that are unilaterally imposed by one country, as the U.S. does in its GSP program, other trade legislation, banana worker litigation, and Alien Tort Claims Act, run a risk of creating justified anxiety that the U.S. will not abide by true international standards and thus that other countries would be foolish to do so. Second, it is clear that agreements on labour standards will never be selfenforcing in the manner of tariff agreements or customs unions. To threaten a trading rival that, should it lower its labour standards, you will lower yours, is neither efficacious nor attractive.
B. Tentative Conclusions on Legal Issues
However tentative, these working hypotheses suggest answers to the three questions about transnational labour standards that we have been calling the legal scholar's: regulatory redundancy; the role of unilateralism; and the problem of sanctions.
Regulatory redundancy
Regulatory redundancy, at least between truly international standards (like ILO Conventions) and standards in treaties (such as NAFTA or bilateral trade agreements), now appears functional. The standards in the bilateral and small-group treaties can create the assurance that trading partners will also raise labour standards, assurance that will move all parties from a suboptimal Nash equilibrium to a Pareto-optimal cooperative solution. The experimental literature suggests that such small groups can achieve such solutions. The international standards will not by themselves create such assurance, but can provide coordination points for the smaller-scale bargaining.
This emphasis on trust and assurance implies that transnational regulation may be more effective by concentrating on issues that do not evoke national pride or tradition, and therefore are better suited for building trust and assurance. For example, the ILO might be much better off adding a right to basic health and safety to its core labour values, and emphasizing it, if necessary, perhaps even over such issues as child labour or antidiscrimination, important as those are. The latter are issues on which national variation is probably inevitable, because of differing social and religious traditions. It also appears that nearly all countries voluntarily end child labour when annual family income exceeds US $7000 in current values, so ending child labour really requires a commitment to general economic development as opposed to targeted enforcement. 43 By contrast, a proposed ILO effort on workplace toxins would have no conflict with national or religious traditions. Teams of technical experts might annually identify twenty or thirty of the most dangerous work processes or toxins in use in the world. This process would be technical, nonpolitical, and draw on expertise. Countries would then commit to the eradication of processes and chemicals appearing on the annual list. The ILO would provide technical assistance in this process, for example by suggesting alternatives. The ILO's health and safety standards could then become reference points for national legislation and negotiated treaties. The point is that such a calm, technical process would itself become the means of building trust and respect for ILO standards that would carry over into more controversial efforts such as initiatives against child labour or discrimination.
The model also implies that the real negotiations over labour standards for developing countries should probably be among those countries themselves. If powerful countries impose labour standards on developing countries, these will probably reflect in many, though not all, cases an agenda of protecting standards in the developed country. This objection cannot be raised when the developing countries themselves are encouraged to set the standards that overcome collective action problems and punish defectors. As we have seen, even when standards are international, such as ILO conventions, peer group effects will play a large role in determining which countries ratify them. 44 Under the model presented here, transnational labour standards are basically pacts among developing countries, or countries at similar levels of development and with similar export orientation. However, there is a mismatch between this feature of labour standards and the 45 existing institutions for their promulgation. The latter are either international institutions dominated by the more powerful countries, or, worse yet, standards propounded unilaterally by those countries, to which we now turn. country has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers in the country (including any designated zone in that country)" or "(H) Such country has not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.").
19 U.S.C. §2702(b)(7) (countries not eligible for favorable tariff treatment unless 48 "taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights (as defined in section 507(4) of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 USCS § 2467(4)]) to workers in the country (including any designated zone in that country)." 19 U.S.C. §3703(a)(1)(F)(country eligible if it "has established, or is making continual 49 progress toward establishing, protection of internationally recognized worker rights, including the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of children, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health".)
Cases cited supra n. 17.
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Cases cited supra n. 12. We can now explain exactly what might be the cost of such unilateralism, by Americans or others. The game theory perspective of this Chapter suggests that the main obstacle to countries' lifting their own standards is the fear that their trading rivals will not, leaving them with the sucker's payoff (a hare). Overcoming this fear does not require fundamental reordering of motivation, but rather the building of the trust and assurance needed to overcome short-term advantage (the hare within reach) in favor of longer-term cooperation (bringing down a stag). Unilateralism of the kind seen recently in America potentially destroys this trust and assurance, for it graphically suggests that all countries would be wise to pursue their own labour standards since everyone else, particularly the biggest player, is doing the same. This has certainly been true of the administration of Generalized Systems of Preference, not merely in theory but in practice, and, apparently, in legal findings as well.
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Dan Danielsen and Karl Klare have recently explored a recent example of US unilateralism that seems to exemplify the costs of unilateralism. US growers of commercial 54 catfish have recently succeeded in obtaining anti-dumping tariffs against Vietnamese catfish filets. Since the tariffs are prohibitive, Vietnamese catfish is effectively barred from the US market. The successive finding by the US Department of Commerce and US International Trade Commission, that Vietnam was "dumping" catfish, rested entirely on the finding that Vietnam is a "nonmarket economy". This permitted the US authorities to ignore the inability of the US catfish producers to show that catfish in fact are sold for less in the US than in Vietnam. This is a unilateral imposition by the US of its own version of labour standards. It plainly merely protects a politically powerful domestic industry and will do nothing to raise labour standards in Vietnam. Such unilateral linking of trade benefits to labour or other standards potentially accomplishes little for labour standards and seriously undermines transnational institutions and multinational trust. It is entirely different from a hypothetical proceeding in which the ILO, or some other transnational authority, or, preferably, Vietnam's peers, actually found Vietnam to be out of compliance with core labour standards and permitted countries to invoke trade remedies. Under the model presented in this Chapter, it is possible to imagine how such targeted invocation of trade remedies might induce Vietnam to permit free trade unions, or end some other specified labour practice. By contrast, the US approach is linked to no specific labour practice and effectively punishes Vietnam for its entire economic system. It will result in no change in Vietnam and reinforces the perception that the US does not and will not play by the rules of free trade that it imposes on others.
As with all other claims in this paper, this one, too, is ultimately empirical. One would need to study the relationship between unilateral imposition of standards and later ability to reach cooperative solutions.
The Problem of Sanctions
While a game theory perspective may illuminate the problem of sanctions in transnational labour regulation, it cannot answer this question without much more precise empirical specification of the costs and benefits. From a game theory perspective, we can certainly see a case for, and a case against, tougher sanctions.
The case for sanctions is that they can increase the assurance that other countries will indeed comply with negotiated standards and thus increase voluntary compliance by all the others. The case against sanctions is that sanctions that are seen as harsh or arbitrary may destroy the very trust and cooperation that is the only long-term hope for labour standards.
The empirical and experimental literature on games does not answer this question. In a Prisoner's Dilemma, optimal solutions can be achieved by cooperating until a partner defects and then sanctioning him or her. However, for reasons we have explored, transnational labour 55 regulation is not a Prisoner's Dilemma but a Stag Hunt, and there has been little experimental inquiry into the role of sanctions in overcoming the low trust that often prevents large groups from reaching Pareto-optimal cooperative solutions. This is a question to which I hope to return in future work.
